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Introduction
The economic slowdown across the world caused by the financial crisis has taken its toll on poverty in developing countries. Recent World Bank global estimates for poverty suggest that the global slowdown caused by the crisis could add an extra 50 million to the number of people living below $1.25 a day and 64 million to the number below $2 a day, compared to a scenario of uninterrupted growth in the absence of the crisis. By 2010, the crisis is projected to add an estimated 89 million to the number of people living below $1.25 a day and 120 million to the number below $2 a day (Chen and Ravallion, 2009) . Along with the impact on poverty numbers, the crisis is also likely to have significant impacts on the distribution of income and consumption among the poor and non-poor, both within and between countries. It is difficult, however, to predict the distributional impacts of the crisis with a high degree of confidence. Evidence from previous crises suggests that relative inequality falls about as often as it rises during aggregate contractions (Paci et al, 2008) . Furthermore, as the crisis rapidly spreads across countries and within countries (through adjustments in domestic credit and labor markets and fiscal policies), its impacts across different groups, sectors or areas have become all the more difficult to track.
An analysis of how the crisis has affected poverty and distribution of welfare in a particular countryincluding Philippines, the subject of this paper -would need to address a few key questions. These are: how are the impacts going to be shared across the distribution of income or consumption, which sectors and regions are likely to be impacted, and what are the characteristics of those who would become poor as a result of the crisis? In order to be useful to policymakers, these questions would have to be analyzed ex ante, with available data that in most cases pre-date the crisis, rather than be delayed till the time post-(or during) crisis data become available. In the case of Philippines, the latest available household data is from 2006, which would imply that any analysis of how the crisis is likely to affect poverty and income distribution must rely on ex ante simulation methods. Even if some real-time data from households were available, an ex ante approach would still be needed to simulate impacts for hypothetical scenarios that have not yet occurred, or the impacts of other, unanticipated shocks to the economy (in the case of Philippines, typhoons that occurred very recently) .
Current approaches to analyze ex ante the impact of a macroeconomic shock, with the limited data available in most countries, are somewhat inadequate in addressing the kind of questions posed above. To improve upon existing approaches given the typical data constraints seen in most developing countries, including Philippines, we use in this paper a microsimulation model to evaluate ex-ante the distributional impacts of the crisis in a country. Section 2 below provides a brief background of poverty trends in Philippines in recent times and the macroeconomic impact of the crisis in the country. Section3 Firstly, reduced demand for exports, which account for 47.3% of the GDP, is likely to result in reduced labor demand, particularly in the electronics, textile, and garment sectors. As urban, formal sector workers lose their jobs, they could move to the informal sector, which would tend to depress informal sector wages. Secondly, domestic remittances from urban workers to rural households are likely to decrease. This is problematic in light of the fact that 47% of households in 2006 relied on domestic remittances as a source of income. Thirdly, a reduction in international commodity prices (for example, the price of coconut) may have an adverse impact on the income of agricultural workers.
Although a reduction in foreign remittances could have potentially occurred due to the impact of the crisis in labor markets countries where OFWs are located, the available macro projections do not contemplate such a decline but rather predict a slightly increase in international remittances (Table 1) . OFWs account for an estimated 27.5% of the total labor force, and send remittances to about a quarter of Filipino households, in amounts that add up to as much as 10% of GDP. Table 1 shows the aggregate and sectorspecific growth rate projections for the Philippines, obtained from the World Bank Country team (see Annex 2, Table A .2 for more detailed data). Two macroeconomic scenarios are considered for each of the years (2009 and 2010) : (i) benchmark -the scenario that was expected in the absence of the crisis; and (ii) crisis -the scenario that is expected (or occurred in the case of 2009) with crisis.
Overall GDP growth is expected to be 3.3 and 1.9 percentage points lower with crisis than in the benchmark scenario in 2009 and 2010 respectively. The biggest shock is expected in manufacturing, primarily due to a fall in demand for manufacturing exports. In 2009, the growth of manufacturing output is estimated to fall by 10.2 percentage points, from a 4% expansion to a 6% contraction. The sector is expected to register a small positive growth rate in 2010, but that will still be 3.2 percentage points lower than what manufacturing growth would have been in the absence of the crisis.
The spillover effect from the decline in manufacturing -including lower domestic demand for goods and services -is likely to have an impact on other sectors as well, especially services. Output growth in the services sector is projected to decline due to the crisis by 2.4 and 2.5 percentage points in 2009 and 2010, respectively, compared to the benchmark (no-crisis) scenario. Some impact is expected in the agricultural sector as well due to the spillover effect from other sectors and reduced commodity prices. Agricultural output growth projected to be lower by less than 1.9 percentage points in 2009 and 0.8 percentage points in 2010 due to the crisis. It is important to note that all sectors, with the sole exception of manufacturing in 2009, are expected to register positive growth for both years even with the crisis. The "loss" in growth is in comparison to the scenario of no-crisis for the relevant year, rather than indicating a fall in output from one year to the next.
Interestingly, output growth in the sector "other industries" is expected to be higher during the crisis than in the no-crisis scenario (Table 1) . In 2009 and 2010, the output growth in other industries is expected to be 5.4 and 1.9 percentage points higher in the crisis scenario than in the benchmark scenario. Most likely, this reflects the impact of the stimulus package put in place by the government in response to the crisis, which includes substantial resources for public investment projects and is expected to boost the construction sector.
In addition, the crisis is expected to have a limited impact on remittance flows of $0.8 billion in 2009 and a larger impact of $1.5 billion in 2010 (Table 1) . However, even with the crisis, remittances are expected to grow by $1.6 billion between 2008 and 2010, which is about half of the $3.1 billion growth during this period that was projected in the absence of the crisis.
In sum, the macroeconomic impacts of the crisis are estimated to be reasonably large in 2009, with a slight recovery in 2010. The impacts are driven mostly by a sharp contraction in the manufacturing sector. Remittances do not appear to be a significant factor in driving changes in household income in 2009, implying that the effects of the crisis on households are likely to be felt mainly through its impact on employment and labor earnings.
Proposed approach to simulate poverty and distributional impacts
We propose to use a microsimulation model that combines macroeconomic projections with pre-crisis micro data from household and/or labor force surveys to predict income and consumption at the individual and household level under different scenarios, which can then be compared to measure poverty and distributional impacts. Comparisons will be made between different projected scenarios (most commonly a crisis or low scenario and a benchmark or base scenario) rather than a comparison over time (i.e. a comparison between 2006 and 2009 or 2010 in the case of the Philippines). Figure 1 presents a stylized representation of the methodology.
The model focuses on labor markets and migration as transmission mechanisms and allows for two types of shocks: shocks to labor income, modeled as employment shocks, earnings shocks or a combination of both; and shocks to non-labor income, with special attention paid to international remittances. Shocks can be positive or negative depending on the trends outlined by the macroeconomic projections. In most cases labor income and remittances account for at least 75-80% of household income. Minimum assumptions are made about other sources, such as capital and financial income or public transfers, as discussed below.
The data requirements can be summarized as follows. At the macro level, information is needed on projected (i) output, employment, remittances and (ideally) labor earnings growth; (ii) population growth and (iii) price changes. At the micro level, information is needed on (i) labor and non-labor income, and (ii) labor force status and basic job characteristics, including earnings. Needless to say, the reliability and accuracy of the simulation results is a direct function of the quality and level of detail of the information available at the macro and micro levels.
Finally, the income and consumption projections from the model can be used to produce a variety of outputs, including aggregate poverty and inequality comparisons across scenarios, poverty and vulnerability profiling of specific groups and/or areas, and various summary measures of distributional impacts, such as growth incidence curves and state transition matrices. We comment on these extensively for the case of the Philippines below.
Overview of simulation exercise
In this Section we provide a brief overview of the mechanics underpinning the simulation exercise. The exercise can be broken down into three distinct steps: calibration, simulation and assessment of impacts. A description of each step follows and a schematic of the complete model is presented in Figure 2 . Calibration. Calibration is the process by which household and individual-level information is used to model labor market behavior and outcomes and to predict the likelihood of receiving remittances. 2 This is done in three steps. First, we model labor force status for all working age individuals (15-64) as a function of household and individual characteristics, where labor force status can be out of the labor force, unemployed, and employed in agriculture, manufacturing, other industries or services. Although ideally we would like to work with a more detailed menu of options, the number of labor force states that can be considered is dictated by the level of disaggregation available for the macro projections. We then use a multinomial logit to estimate the parameters of the model, as well as the individual-level probability of remaining in a particular state and/or changing to a different one, as given by (1). The approach is similar to that used in Ferreira et al (2009) . We estimate the model separately for high and low-skill individuals to allow for structural differences in the labor market behavior of the two groups. Ferreira et al. 2008 ). We use a fairly broad definition of labor earnings for the purpose of the exercise that includes wages and salaries, but also income from self-employment. This is particularly important in the case of agriculture and for economies with large informal sectors, such as Philippines, since wage and salaried workers constitute a limited fraction of those employed in these sectors. It may lead however to a loss in precision and/or predictive power given that the structural relationship between individual and job characteristics and earnings could be different for salaried and non-salaried workers. To allow for maximum flexibility and (indirectly) account for some of these differences we estimate the model separately for agriculture, manufacturing, other industries and services and for low and high-skill workers. The results of the estimation of equations (1) and (2) and a full description of all variables can be found in Annex 1. 2 We estimate a reduced form of the household income-generation model which is based on Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) and Alatas and Bourguignon (2005) 3 For Philippines, low and high-skilled refer to individuals with 0 -9 and >10 years of education, respectively. 4 Notice that, although we could estimate separate models for salaried and non-salaried workers based on the information from the household survey, we would not be able to use these models for the purpose of predicting future earnings since we do not have earnings and employment information disaggregated by salaried/nonsalaried workers from macro data.
Finally, we focus on non-labor income. For this purpose we design an assignment rule for changes in international remittances and make some minimal assumptions about other sources of non-labor income. Ideally, we would estimate a probability model to predict how likely a household would be to receive international remittances, given its characteristics. However, if the migration-related information in the survey is poor or insufficient and/or the predictive power of probability model is low (as is the case for Philippines), we are better-off relying on a simple non-parametric assignment rule that is consistent with the existing evidence (the specific rule used for Philippines is discussed in more detail when we describe the simulation process).
Simulation. Simulation is the process by which information on aggregate projected changes in output, employment and remittances is used to generate changes in labor and non-labor income at the micro level using the structural models developed as part of the calibration. 5 This is done in four steps. 6 First, we use population growth projections to adjust for demographic changes between 2006 (base year) and 2009-2010. This adjustment is particularly important in the case of Philippines because fertility rates are still high, which implies that the number of labor market entrants rises faster than overall population, and the baseline household survey is relatively old. In practical terms, doing this allows us to explicitly take into account changes in the size of the working age population, and hence to distinguish between employment growth driven (or rather absorbed) by demographic trends and net (or additional) employment growth.
Secondly, we use the projections from the labor force status and labor earnings models to replicate projected changes in aggregate total and sectoral output and employment. We start with employment and calculate the total number of individuals that need to be reassigned between employment and nonemployment and across employment sectors in order to match projected aggregate changes in total and sectoral employment. We then use the estimated probabilities from the multinomial model to select candidates for reassignment. 7 The direction and magnitude of flows between employment and nonemployment and across sectors of employment is given by changes in the relative shares of different status with respect to the reference population. For instance, whether individuals must be reassigned from non-employment to employment or vice-versa depends on whether the employment rate of individuals ages 15 to 64 is increasing or decreasing. Similarly, workers are expelled from sectors whose relative share in total employment are declining and absorbed into sectors whose relative share in total employment is increasing.
The sequence in which individuals are reassigned across states and sectors matters for the final simulation results so we briefly describe here the procedure we follow:

Step 1 -Flows in and out of the labor force: If the labor force participation rate is increasing, non-participants with the lowest predicted probability of being out of the labor force will be reassigned. If the labor force participation rate is declining, participants (employed and unemployed) with the highest probability of being inactive will be reassigned. Reassignments will continue up to the point where the change in the labor force participation rate at the micro level matches the change at the macro level.  Step 2 -Flows out of contracting sectors: For sectors whose share of total employment is declining, those individuals with the lowest predicted probability of being employed in the sector will be selected out and added to the pool of "eligible" workers to be unemployed or employed in growing sectors (notice this pool also contains those who have been reassigned from outside the labor force if the total participation rate is growing). Reassignments out of each sector will continue up to the point where the change in the sector employment share at the micro level matches the change at the macro level.  Step 3 -Flows into growing sectors: Individuals in the pool of "eligible" workers will be assigned to growing sectors on the basis of their predicted probability of being employed in each sector. Assignments are made sequentially with the sector whose employment share is growing fastest absorbing workers first and the sector whose employment share is growing the slowest absorbing workers last. Reassignments to each sector will continue up to the point where the change in the sector employment share at the micro level matches the change at the macro level.  Step 4 -Unemployment: Individuals that remain in the pool of "eligible" workers after changes in sectoral employment have been accounted for are classified as unemployed. In other words, unemployment functions as the adjustment variable once predicted changes in the labor force participation and employment rates have been simulated.
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There are a few important features of this process that are worth mentioning. The reassignments described in steps 1 to 3 are calibrated so as to replicate net aggregate flows between employment and non-employment and across sectors. In reality, movements across these different states are quite significant so that gross flows are usually larger than net flows. The order of proposed steps is such that it allows for non-employed individuals to become employed and employed individuals to become nonemployed, but also for individuals to change sectors. In doing this we try to capture the fact that highly "employable" individuals are more likely to remain employed in one sector or another, at times at the expense of less "employable" workers (i.e. highly "employable" workers will crowd others out when employment opportunities become relatively more scarce).
We next use the earnings model estimated as part of the calibration to predict earnings for two groups of workers: those with no previous earning history (i.e. non-employed in 2006) and those who change sector of employment. Because earnings are a function of both observable and unobservable individual 9 and job characteristics, we add a random element to the predicted earnings produced by the model to account for unobserved heterogeneity. 9 For all other individuals, we use the earnings information available in the household survey.
Once all workers have been assigned positive labor earnings, total earnings in a sector are adjusted to match aggregate projected changes in output. This step relies on the fact that that projected changes in sectoral output can be explained by projected changes in sectoral employment and projected changes in sectoral earnings and profits, and assumes that earnings and profits grow at the same rate.
The treatment of public sector workers and those with more than one job differs slightly from what we just described. Total public sector employment is assumed to remain constant (i.e. no individuals are assigned to or out of the public sector) and labor earnings of public sector workers are adjusted in line with their sectoral mapping (agriculture, industry or services). Similarly for those holding more than one job, we assume the sector of employment of their secondary activity remains constant while earnings are adjusted in line with sectoral changes.
The third step in the simulation process pertains to changes in international remittances. As mentioned above, in the case of Philippines we simulate these changes following a very simple allocation rule. We calculate the total change in international remittances between 2006 and 2009-2010, using actual and projected data (this change is positive under both the crisis and the benchmark scenarios) and allocate the dividend as follows: (i) across regions, remittances are allocated proportionally to the 2006 regional distribution; (ii) among households within regions: recipient households are selected at random and given a remittance transfer equivalent in real terms to the average remittance transfer in that region in 2006, with the number of total transfers to be made within each region being equal to the total amount of additional remittances to be distributed divided by the 2006 average value. As a result of this process the overall distribution of remittances across regions remains unchanged; while there is an increase in number of recipient households (both types of households, those who did or did not receive remittances in 2006, can receive new remittances in 2009-10).
Finally we simulate changes in other sources of non-labor income. For this we assume that capital and financial income grow at the same rate as real GDP, public transfers (primarily safety net and Social Security transfers) remain constant in real terms at 2006 levels, and domestic remittances change at the same rate as labor income. These assumptions appear to be reasonable for Philippines, and can be modified for other countries depending on country circumstances.
Assessment of Impacts.
Impact assessment is the process by which we use the information on individual employment status and labor income, as well as on non-labor income at the household level, to generate income distributions and construct various poverty and distributional measures that can then be used to compare the crisis and the benchmark scenarios. This is done in three steps.
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First, we account for the fact that between 2006 and 2009-2010, food prices have increased at a much higher rate than other prices. To do this we adjust the 2006 poverty line by the expected food and nonfood CPI in 2009 (or 2010), using the food and non-food shares in the NCR poverty line as weights (approximately 57% and 43%, respectively). Since these weights are different from those in the CPI, the adjustment reflects the poverty line required for an individual to be able to afford the same food basket despite the disproportionate rise in food prices. This method yields a 2009 (or 2010) poverty line, which we then readjust to 2006 prices using the appropriate general CPI (see Annex 2, Table C ).
Second, we calculate total household income by aggregating labor income across all employed individuals and adding non-labor income, and then use information on household size to construct a measure of per-capita household income, as in (3). (3) Finally, we use information on household and individual income levels to evaluate the poverty and distributional impacts of the crisis by comparing poverty and other outcomes between the benchmark (without crisis) and "with crisis" scenarios. It is important to note that the Philippines poverty line is defined in terms of per capita income, which implies that per capita household income derived from (3) above can be directly compared with the poverty line to obtain poverty measures.
Limitations and caveats of the simulation exercise
The proposed approach has some appealing features, the primary one being its capacity to generate income counterfactuals at the individual and household levels that can then be used to assess impacts across the entire distribution. However, it also has some important limitations that must be taken into account when interpreting the results presented below. We discuss these below.
Firstly, the quality and accuracy of the simulation output is a function of the nature and quality of data underpinning the exercise. The results would depend not only on the micro-models, but also on the macro projections of the crisis and the benchmark or no-crisis scenarios. In a typical ex-ante assessment of this type, building the counterfactual to evaluate impact is especially tricky because the comparison between the situations "with" and "without" the "treatment" (the macro shock) is purely virtual or notional. This is particularly important with regard to the output and employment projections since they are key drivers of the results in the absence of a CGE or similar model. In addition:
 The ability to account for heterogeneity across sectors, groups, and others depends on the level of disaggregation of the available macro projection. For instance, the behavior of the tradeable and non-tradable sectors within industry can only be modeled separately if output growth projections are available for each sector.  The ability to accurately predict employment and earning changes depends on the available information and on the assumptions needed to correct for information gaps. For instance, in the absence of projections on total and sectoral earnings growth, we need to assume that earnings and profits grow at same rate within a sector. How realistic this assumption is would depend on the country and sectoral context.  The ability to directly model and predict changes in the relative shares of formal and informal employment within sectors is limited by the lack of projections on the growth of each type of employment. Instead, formal and informal status are assigned in proportion to what is observed in 2006 for each sector and consequently all compositional changes in sectoral employment are driven by population growth and individual employment transition, rather than more general labor market cyclical dynamics.  The ability to model remittances depends on the quality of the available data on migrants and remittances, particularly for countries with rapid and/or volatile growth of remittances.
Secondly, the simulations implicitly assume that the structural relationships estimated as part of the calibration process on the baseline data continue to be valid in the future years for which the projections are made. The more distant in the past the baseline year is, the more questionable this assumption is likely to be. In the case of Philippines, for example, the baseline year is 2006, which is a full 3 to 4 years away from the prediction years (2009 and 2010) . This particular caveat, however, links directly back to the constraints imposed by availability of data. In most countries, household survey data that is available for analysis and processed to the extent necessary for the analysis is likely to pre-date the prediction years (usually 2010) by at least 3 to 4 years. Fourthly, our model is also limited in its ability to account for shifts in relative prices between different sectors of the economy as a result of the shock. The model does take into account the impact of shifts in the price of food relative to general inflation on poverty measures, via the simple device of adjusting poverty lines that are anchored to a fixed food basket. It can be argued that changes in the relative price of food represent the most significant source of price impact on poor or near-poor households in a country like Philippines, as the recent food crisis has shown. At the same time, there are other potential sources of price impacts -for example, the effect of a change in the terms of trade between agriculture and other sectors on real household incomes in all sectors -our approach does not take into account. Unfortunately, in the absence of a CGE model to link up to, it is nearly impossible to explicitly model for changes in terms of trade between sectors.
The final limitation, related to validation of hypothesis, applies to all ex-ante approaches including ours. The only validation or test for our simulation model is to combine ex-ante and ex-post analysis (see Bourguignon and Ferreira, 2003) . Since ex post data will not be available for some time, some uncertainty about the simulations generated by the ex-ante evaluations is bound to remain. However, a preliminary validation of the model using historical data suggests that the model performs well in predicting poverty and distributional changes (i.e. projected changes are very close to actual data).
Presentation of simulation results
Before describing the impact on poverty, it is useful to trace the way the macro impacts are transmitted to the households. In the Philippines, given the nature of the macroeconomic impacts, the main transmission channel is the labor market.
What did the Filipino labor market look like in the baseline year before the crisis? In 2006 -the last year for which household poverty data are available and therefore the baseline data for our projections -69% of the working-age population (15-64) was active in the labor force, of which about 91% was employed. Among those employed, 51% were employed in services, 34% in agriculture, 10% in manufacturing, and 6% in other industries. The employed population includes those working for wages/salaries, the self-employed and those contributing labor to household-based enterprises or activities that produce income for the household. On average, 67% of household income comes from labor earnings and 15% comes from international remittances, which form about 22% of non-labor income (see Annex 2, Table B for detailed figures).
The population growth rate between 2006 and 2010 is projected to be 8.2%, with a higher growth rate (10.8%) projected for the working age population.
Employment growth projections for 2009 and 2010 are computed using past trends in output and employment and GDP projections shown in Table 1 above. 11 Lower GDP growth rates in 2009 and 2010 due to the crisis would translate into employment impacts. Historically, the output elasticity of labor force participation has been slightly positive in the Philippines, which is reflected in our results. Labor force participation is slightly higher in the crisis scenario than in the benchmark scenario, both in 2009 and 2010. Employment rates among the active population, however, show a different pattern. The overall employment rate in the crisis scenario is 1.0 and 1.8 percent lower than in the benchmark scenario in 2009 and 2010 respectively (see Table 2 ). Interestingly, the impact of the crisis on poverty is larger in 2010 than in 2009 despite a recovery in economic growth will recover in 2010. This is due to the fact that the 2010 figure reflects the cumulative 11 See Annex 2, Tables A.2 and A.3 for detailed projections. 
Aggregate impact on poverty and inequality
Average household income is expected to be 2.2% lower in 2009 and 3.6% lower in 2010 as a result of the crisis, compared to the benchmark (no-crisis) scenario. The drop in 2009 income is mainly due to a 3.0% drop in labor income, along with a marginal (0.6%) drop in non-labor income. In 2010, the larger impact is due to drops in both labor income (4.6%) and non-labor income (1.9%). The significantly higher loss in non-labor income in 2010 is due to a larger (2.3%) loss in remittances in 2010 compared to a 0.5% drop in 2009 (see Annex 2, Table B for the detailed estimates on household income). to the crisis (relative to the no-crisis scenario). Secondly, the impact on household income and poverty 
How the poverty impact is spatially distributed -across regions and urban/rural areas
The impact of the global crisis is not distributed uniformly across the Philippines. The crisis is expected to have a larger effect on urban centers with a large manufacturing base. Thus we expect to find greater impacts in the richer and highly urbanized regions of NCR, Calabarzon, and Central Luzon, which together account for nearly half of employment in the industry and services sectors, including the manufacture of electronic products. These regions also receive the most international remittances.
Our simulation results conform to these expectations. The poverty headcount rate is higher by more than 10% due to the crisis (as a percentage of the poverty rate in the no-crisis or benchmark scenario) in NCR, Calabarzon, and Central Luzon (Figure 3 ). The poverty rate in the highly dense, urban region of NCR, which is home to Manila, is projected to be higher by about 25% due to the crisis. The regions of Visayas and Mindanao, which are more rural and dependent on agricultural employment, are less affected (lower than 7% poverty impact), despite the decline in the prices of copra and coconut oil, which are among the country's largest exports.
Box 2: Poverty impact of the October 2009 typhoons
The Philippines was hit by four typhoons in the month of October, 2009, two of which made landfall in the National Capital Region of Manila. All together, the typhoons had a devastating cumulative effect, causing heavy rain and winds, and massive floods which washed away shanty towns on the coast. Access to electricity was severely affected, and over 300,000 houses are believed to have been damaged. The typhoons are expected to result in lower output and greater poverty. Our microsimulation model is able to capture some of these effects by treating the typhoon impact as a macro shock. In order to do so, we use macroeconomic projections of the effects of the typhoons on output and employment to determine the household-level impacts. The baseline scenarios for 2009 and 2010 are the crisis scenarios as calculated by the model. Thus, we are able to determine the cumulative impact of the typhoons and the financial crisis as compared to 2006. Table 3a shows the poverty impacts of the typhoons according to this methodology. Poverty is expected to increase by 0.5 percentage points in 2009 and 0.7 percentage points in 2010. The increase according to the Poverty gap is larger in 2010 than in 2009. The impact on inequality, however, is negligible.
These differences also manifest themselves in the aggregate rural-urban poverty impacts, with the urban poverty rate rising much more than the rural poverty rate relative to their corresponding benchmark poverty rates (11.5% and 5.2% rise for urban and rural poverty rates, respectively) due to the crisis (Figure 3 ). The income impact in urban areas is also much larger -average urban household income with crisis is 4.3% lower than that in the benchmark while average rural household income in crisis is 2.5% lower than in the benchmark (see Annex 2, Table D .1). This difference is driven mostly by a change in labor income, which would decline relatively more in urban areas (5.6% of the benchmark) than in rural areas (3.0% of the benchmark).
It is important to note that the absolute change in the poverty headcount rate is nearly identical across the regions and across urban and rural areas, at around 2 percentage points ( Figure 3 ). The same absolute change in poverty headcount however translates into much higher percentage change in poverty in the richer, urbanized regions because these regions start with a lower headcount. Moreover, the same absolute increase in poverty rate would imply many more people in poverty in the denser, more urbanized areas than in the less densely populated areas of Other Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao.
However, even after taking into account the significantly higher impact of the crisis in the urban regions, the regional gaps in poverty and income levels would continue to remain large in 2010. This is because the gaps in 2006 -the baseline year for all the simulations -were large to start with ( Figure 4 and Figure  5 ), and poverty reduction has been slow over the past few years. NCR, Calabarzon, and Central Luzon are projected to remain the (significantly) richer regions of the country, with Other Luzon, Visayas, and Mindanao remaining as the poor regions. 
Impact of the crisis by gender
According to the simulation results, poverty will increase relatively more among female-headed households than among male-headed households due to the crisis -the impact on the headcount is 11.9% versus 7.6% in 2010 (Table  4) . Poverty rates will continue to be significantly lower among female-headed households. These differences can be attributed to slightly higher declines in employment (across all sectors, but especially in services) and average household labor income among female-headed households.
In general, labor income is more negatively impacted for female-headed households -in aggregate (household) terms as well as in terms of average earning per worker (Table 4 ). In 2009, this is mostly due to a larger loss in manufacturing earnings, whereas in 2010 the impact is distributed more evenly across sectors.
Distributional impact of the crisis: Going beyond poverty and inequality indices
By generating predicted levels of income and consumption for all households in benchmark and crisis scenarios, our simulation model allows us to examine the type of households that are likely to be affected by the crisis, the primary channels of impact and their relative importance, and the distribution of the impact across different income groups. Here we present the results from three types of analysis FIES (2005) that have been selected primarily for illustrative purposes. We also present the results for 2010 only, when the relatively larger impact of the crisis is expected.
Firstly, we examine the characteristics of the group we will call "crisis-vulnerable", which refers to households that would not have been poor in 2010 had there been no crisis. Secondly, we will use the well-known analytical device of growth incidence curves to see how change in income, as a result of the crisis, is distributed across income groups and between urban/rural areas and regions. Thirdly, we will construct a few transition matrices to look at upward and downward movement of households as a result of the crisis, compared to the benchmark. These are but examples of what is possible in the way of distributional analysis with the results of our model; the choice of what type of analytics needs to be done for a certain country would depend on the specific country context and policy concerns.
A profile of the "crisis-vulnerable". Households that are expected to be in poverty in the crisis scenario but not in the benchmark scenario in 2010, termed as the "crisis-vulnerable", are projected to suffer large income losses due to the crisis, relative to the benchmark scenario -with a 39% drop in average household income, which translates to a 45% loss in per capita income. Most of this loss is due to a massive loss in labor income, amounting to 48% of the benchmark income. Remittances are less important as a component of the overall income loss of the "crisis-vulnerable" households. Although there is a 33% loss in remittance income for households conditional on receiving remittances in the first place, the absolute amounts are too small to have a significant impact on poverty.
The key characteristics of crisis-vulnerable households, relative to the rest of the population, are as follows (see Annex 2, Table E for all results). Comparing the crisis-vulnerable to the overall population, the crisis-vulnerable are slightly more rural (57.1% as compared to the overall figure of 51.5%), have slightly larger household sizes (5.1 people per household as compared to the national average of 4.8) and have nearly identical dependency ratios. The crisis-vulnerable have lower skills on average -67.3% of household heads have education 0-9 years compared to the national average of 55.9%. Although the employment rates are very similar among the two groups, the sectoral composition is quite different. Crisis-vulnerable household heads are more likely to be employed in agriculture and manufacturing, and less likely to be employed in services or other industry. This result further underscores our initial assertion that the shock is likely to manifest itself through lack of demand for exports in the manufacturing sector and commodity price decreases in the agricultural sector.
It is also interesting to look at how these crisis-vulnerable households compare with the permanently or structurally poor (defined as the households who are poor in both benchmark and crisis scenarios in 2010). In general, structurally poor households are larger, have higher dependency and are lower skilled. They are also far more likely to be employed in agriculture (64.0% of the structurally poor as opposed to 36.9% of the crisis-vulnerable), and subsequently less likely to be employed in manufacturing (4.8% as compared to 11.3%) or services (27.4% as compared to 48.5%). This is understandable since those employed in manufacturing tend to be better off in general, even though they are the demographic most likely to be worse off as a result of the crisis. The crisis-vulnerable households are also significantly less rural than the structurally poor households (see Annex 2, Table E ).
The profile of crisis-vulnerable households is consistent with our a priori intuition. The reduction in labor income is the primary channel of impact for households that are predicted to become poor as a direct result of the crisis. Compared to the general population, households vulnerable to the crisis are disproportionately employed in manufacturing because output and income losses are expected to occur in these sectors. They are also less skilled than the general population, but quite similar in terms of dependency, household size, and rural-urban composition.
The crisis-vulnerable or the "newly poor" households as a result of the crisis are also different in a number of key aspects from the more permanently poor. Compared to the structurally poor, they have "better" characteristics (lower dependency, higher skills, living in urban areas and employed outside agriculture) -characteristics that our simulations indicate would have taken them out of poverty had there been no crisis. How income losses between benchmark and crisis scenarios are distributed. This analysis is similar to the familiar growth incidence curves (GICs), in examining how the changes in per capita income between benchmark and crisis scenarios in 2010 vary across the income distribution. GICs are commonly used to look at the distribution of growth over time; however the same device is useful to see changes between two "states" of the world as well, in this case the benchmark (no-crisis) and crisis states for the same point in time. A GIC in this case will plot the percentage change in per capita income between 2010 benchmark and crisis scenarios for every centile (1% of the population) in the benchmark distribution of per capita income (when the households are ordered by per capita income).
For the country overall, the GIC of loss in per capita income (as a percentage of the benchmark income) shows significant losses (ranging from 3% to just above 4%) for households the 10 th and 90 th percentiles of the income distribution (Figure 6a ). The largest losses (4-7%) occur for the bottom 10 percent of the distribution, but this finding is of less significance since the errors in measuring income can be high for Looking at how the impact is distributed within urban and rural areas, there are some important differences between the two areas ( Figure 6b) . The urban incidence curve shows higher impacts for the bottom 10% of the distribution and lower impacts above the 70 th percentile, while the rural incidence curve is quite flat, with marginally higher impacts seen only for some of the poorest (below 10 th percentile) and wealthy (70 th to 90 th percentile) groups. It is important to note that the percentiles of expenditures are defined with reference to each area (urban or rural). Since urban areas are better off on the average than rural areas, the k th percentile of urban households is better off than (and thus not strictly comparable with) the k th percentile of rural households.
These results imply that the urban poor, near-poor and middle-class (up to the 70 th percentile of the urban distribution) are more adversely affected than richer urban households, while the impacts are more evenly distributed among rural households. Notably, the impact is significantly higher among urban households than among rural households for the entire range of the distribution, consistent with earlier results showing that the poverty impact is relatively higher in urban areas (refer to Figure 3 ). The regional GIC (Figure 7 ) reinforces our earlier result about urban poverty in the NCR, Central Luzon, and Calabarzon. Especially in NCR, the poorest are by far the worst affected, with the effects sharply declining as one moves to the top of the income distribution. Calabarzon shows a similar trajectory, although there the middle class and the poor appear to face similar impacts, and in Central Luzon, it is primarily the middle class who bear the brunt of the crisis.
-11.00 -10.00 -9.00 -8.00 -7.00 -6.00 -5.00 -4.00 -3.00 -2.00 % Change Movements of households up or down the distribution due to the crisis. The GICs described above provide a clear picture of the incidence of the losses in income due to the crisis across the entire distribution. They also lead to some important follow-up questions from a distributional perspective: where would the households suffering these losses end up relative to other households as a result of the crisis, and what is the extent of "churning" that occurs in the distribution as a result of the crisis? Transition matrices are useful to address such questions, by indicating movements up or down the income distribution between the crisis and benchmark scenarios. These matrices are constructed for deciles of per capita income and labor income, keeping the upper and lower limits of each decile fixed at the 2010 benchmark income levels. This implies that movements up or down by households in these matrices reflect the shifts that occur as a result of the crisis, relative to the benchmark (no-crisis) income distribution (see Annex 2, Table F ). Figure 8 shows the share of households in each decile that (i) remain in the same decile, (ii) move up to a higher decile or (iii) move down to a lower decile as a result of the crisis. Summing across all deciles, 84.5% of households are found to remain in the same decile by per capita income, while 83.4% do so for deciles by per capita labor income. Given that the deciles are fixed at the benchmark level and the crisis yields an overall loss of income, movements down are much more common than movements up.
The most significant downward movements occur for households in the middle of the distribution, namely in the 5 th -8 th deciles by per capita total income, with the largest movement occurring for those in the 7 th decile. The movements between deciles of per capita labor income are smaller, with the largest movements occurring for the 7 th and 8 th deciles. Upward movements are extremely rare. Thus the highest amount of "churning" occurs in the middle part of the distribution (5 th to 8 th deciles), with downward movements being more common for the middle and upper-middle class relative to the poor and the richest. Between 15.5% and 17.5% of households in the 5 th to 8 th deciles of per capita income move down to a lower decile as a result of the crisis. Labor income losses (that are significant enough to lead to downward movements) show a very similar outcome to the total income losses, because, as discussed earlier, they are the largest drivers of overall income loss.
Conclusion: Implications of our results
Even with the caveats and limitations discussed in Section 3, our model appears to yield reasonable and intuitively appealing results, based on a transparent and flexible approach using macro projections and household survey data that are typically available in a developing country. The value that our model adds to the simpler models (e.g. POVSTAT or elasticity based methods that are most commonly used in the World Bank) is the ability to analyze potential distributional impacts in detail, linking these changes to the channels through which the impact of the crisis is likely to flow. The application of our model to Philippines yields some useful insights relevant to the country, in three main areas discussed below: monitoring of impacts of the crisis, providing deeper insights into who are likely to be affected by the crisis, and how that in turn can inform the design of policies to mitigate impacts.
Firstly, our results suggest that in the Philippines, a select few indicators are prime candidates to monitor as "leading" or real-time indicators for the poverty and distributional impact of the financial crisis, or of future shocks with macroeconomic impacts similar to this crisis. To be useful for rapid monitoring of poverty and distributional impacts, the indicators must be easily obtained and measurable, sensitive to changes in economic conditions, and correlated with changes in poverty and distribution. By these criteria, movement of wages and employment in manufacturing and services, changes in remittance flows from abroad and the movement of prices (particularly food prices) can serve as useful indicators for rapid monitoring of economic shocks in Philippines. It is important to notice, however, that data on wages is only collected in the October round of the Labor Force survey and made available with a large time gap. Inclusion of monitoring questions on wages in other LFS quarters, together with timelier processing and publication of the information could significantly enhance the government's capacity to monitor potential poverty and distributional impacts of macroeconomic shocks.
Why these indicators? From our analysis, the labor market emerges as the major source of impact in Philippines, with the effects being transmitted through loss of employment in certain sectors (primarily manufacturing) and lower labor earnings as output growth slows. Another channel of impact is remittance flows, since remittance growth in 2010 is expected to fall below what was expected before the crisis had occurred. Any rapid, unexpected change in food (mainly rice) prices could also have a significant impact on poverty -at least in the short-run when wages would lag behind food prices. These indicators also have the advantage of being relatively easy to monitor -with administrative or financial data (for aggregate remittance flows), and quick market or household surveys (prices and wages).
Tracking wages as a part of rapid monitoring would be particularly important. First, growth slowdown in a country like Philippines is more likely to be manifested in lower earnings rather than open unemployment -a hypothesis supported by our results as well. Second, while wages represent only a part of the labor earnings from a sector, wages are much easier to track (e.g. through quarterly labor force or quick enterprise surveys) than income from household enterprises and self-employment. Wages are also likely to be reasonably correlated with broader measures of labor income, particularly in the manufacturing sector where most of the labor market impact is expected.
Secondly, our results indicate that just focusing on poverty numbers would provide a partial view of the distributional impact of the crisis in Philippines. It is useful here to revisit some of the key distributional results. The adverse impact on income, while occurring throughout the income distribution, is somewhat larger for those in the 50 th to 90 th percentile of the national distribution -a group that can be characterized as the middle-class. Also, underlying the national results are important urban-rural and spatial differences in the magnitude and distribution of the impact. Urban households are projected to suffer relatively larger losses than rural households, with the result that income losses and poverty impact would be higher in regions that are more urbanized (NCR, Central Luzon and Calabarzon). Within urban areas the incidence of loss would be higher for the poor and the middle-class (the bottom 70 percent of the urban distribution), while rural losses are more evenly distributed.
Thus the urban poor and near-poor would appear to be key groups of concern from a public policy perspective, as the groups most likely to slip into (or deeper into) poverty. While public programs would have little role to play in directly mitigating the losses suffered by the middle and upper-middle classes, these losses may have important political economy implications. The fact that the impact is relatively high for the urban middle-class (40 th -70 th percentile of the urban distribution) could be particularly significant from a political economy perspective.
Finally, our results provide useful insights on the types of households who are likely to be poor as a direct result of the crisis. Such households are found to have characteristics somewhat different from those of the structurally poor -more likely than the structurally poor to be urban and employed in nonagricultural sectors, and with higher skills and fewer dependents in households. This would imply that any intervention to mitigate the impact of the crisis on vulnerable households would need to be modified (or designed differently) from that of the traditional safety net programs. Also, the income and poverty impacts are somewhat higher for households headed by women than for those headed by men. While more analysis needs to be done to fully understand the source of this gender difference, the seemingly higher vulnerability of female-headed households to the crisis is important to take into account in gauging the impact of the crisis and considering policy responses.
Apart from these somewhat general statements, a discussion of what kinds of public policies and programs are best suited to mitigate the impact of such a macroeconomic shock in Philippines is beyond the scope of this paper. The results from our simulation exercise, however, can be useful in informing such discussions, at least till the time when actual survey data become available on who are being impacted by the macroeconomic shock and to what extent. II. Earnings ($/month) Mean per worker (5) vii 
